<div dir="ltr">Dear Haifuxers,<br>Recalling the vast amount of discussions regarding critical issues such as choosing a logo for Haifux (<a href="http://haifux.org/logo.html">http://haifux.org/logo.html</a>), some of you may be interested in this talk...<br>
Orna<br><div class="gmail_quote">
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----- Forwarded message from CS Colloquium <<a href="mailto:colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL">colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL</a>> -----<br>
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2010 08:43:15 +0200<br>
From: CS Colloquium <<a href="mailto:colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL">colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL</a>><br>
Reply-To: CS Colloquium <<a href="mailto:colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL">colloq@CS.TECHNION.AC.IL</a>><br>
Subject: Tal Moran on Tuesday 16/02/2010<br>
To: <a href="mailto:CS-COLOQ-L@LISTSERV.TECHNION.AC.IL">CS-COLOQ-L@LISTSERV.TECHNION.AC.IL</a><br>
<br>
Time+Place : Tuesday 16/02/2010 14:30 room 337-8 Taub Bld.<br>
Speaker : Tal Moran<br>
Affiliation: CRCS, Harvard University<br>
Host : Erez Petrank<br>
Title : Cryptography by the People, for the People:<br>
How Voting and Cryptography Go Hand-in-Hand<br>
<br>
Abstract :<br>
A democratic election is a classic example of a task in which multiple<br>
adversarial parties must collaborate and agree on an outcome.<br>
Traditional election systems (such as the one used in Israel) employ various<br>
means to ensure that the result will be accurate even if some of the people<br>
involved are corrupt or dishonest. However, the final tally is only as<br>
trustworthy as the people who count the votes. Even in the most secure<br>
systems these are usually fairly small committees. If an entire committee<br>
colludes, they can manufacture their own results. Even worse, depending on<br>
the exact setup, it may be feasible to stuff ballot boxes, destroy votes or<br>
perform other manipulations.<br>
<br>
Using cryptographic techniques, it is possible to design a fair voting<br>
system whose correct operation can be verified by anyone, while still<br>
retaining ballot secrecy.<br>
This can be done even if the computers used to run the election are<br>
untrustworthy.<br>
<br>
In the talk, I will briefly survey the techniques used to accomplish this<br>
and present in more detail examples with some unique properties, such as a<br>
practical solution for securely tallying Single Transferable Vote elections<br>
(a ranked voting system that is used in Australia, Ireland and Malta, among<br>
others). The talk will contain any necessary cryptographic background.<br>
<br>
Based on joint works with Moni Naor and with Josh Benaloh, Lee Naish, Kim<br>
Ramchen and Vanessa Teague.<br>
<br>
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Mon Jan 25 08:43:15 IST 2010<br>
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----- End forwarded message -----<br>
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